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Abstract
In his public lecture ‘On the American Indians’ given at the University 
of Salamanca in 1538-39, Francisco de Vitoria presented an unsettling 
defense of freedom of movement, arguing that the Spanish had the 
right to travel and dwell in the New World, since it was considered 
part of the law of nations [ius gentium] that men enjoyed free mutual 
intercourse anywhere they went. This argument has been seen on 
multiple occasions as a justification of the expansion of the Spanish 
empire. However, this research claims that the right to travel advocated 
by Vitoria was not intended to be interpreted in absolute terms, for it 
had to serve the purpose of bringing peace and unity among men, and 
could not contradict natural law. Vitoria’s legacy is of enormous value 
as it initiated a long lasting discussion regarding the question of the 
grounds under which human mobility could be restricted.  
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What land so barbarous is this that we are barred the hospitality of the shore?” 
Virgil’s Aeneid (I. 539-540)
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It is calculated that between 250.000 and 300.000 Spaniards travelled legally and 
illegally to Spanish America during this period, initiating an age that witnessed 
the import of millions of African slaves, and the reduction to a tenth of a native 
population initially estimated between fifty and sixty million (Newson, 2006: 
143-152). These controversial encounters brought the issue of the circulation 
of peoples across frontiers to the peripheries of some of the discussions on the 
Spanish affairs in the Indies, mostly centered on doctrines such as the ‘just war’ 
and the ‘natural rights’ of the Indians. The principle of freedom of movement 
suggested hopeful expectations, promising to bring mankind together and 
strengthen the ties of fraternity. However, it proved to lead to polemic situations 
when those whose mobility was in question, represented a harmful threat or 
were for some reason undesired. This dilemma was present in the work of 
the Spanish Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1483/92-1546), who 
presented an unsettling defense of freedom of movement, by arguing that the 
Spaniards had the right to travel and dwell in the New World (Vitoria, 1991: 
278).
Vitoria and his early disciples founded the School of Salamanca, also known 
as the Neo-Thomists or the Second Scholastics because of their close relation 
to the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Vitoria’s appeal to the right to travel 
was strongly linked to the Spanish Dominicans’ ideal of a cosmopolitan world 
order which claimed the equality of all human beings by natural law. Their 
universalist principles applied to all, including the natives of the New World, 
whose rights to property and jurisdiction were especially recognized under 
this tradition, regardless of being considered infidels and ‘uncivilized’ (Vitoria, 
1991: 239-251). Along these same lines there was a revival of the ancient 
roman doctrine of the law of nations [ius gentium], a set of laws assumed to be 
common to all societies, intervening on issues such as war, diplomacy, property, 
and particularly relevant here, the circulation of goods and peoples (Skinner, 
1978: 153).
This text will focus on Francisco de Vitoria’s defense of freedom of 
movement in the context of the doctrine of the law of nations, in an attempt 
to explore the grounds under which he considered that a traveler could be 
legitimately rejected or expelled from a community. I would like to suggest that 
the right to travel argued by Vitoria was not supportive of the expansion of the 
Spanish empire, in sharp contrast to those who have seen in Vitoria’s support 
for open borders a justification of conquest and exploitation. I consider that a 
more detailed look at Vitoria’s text is required, together with the study of some 
of his earliest works, where some of his insights on the law of nations could 
shed some light on the limits he explicitly or implicitly gave to the right to 
travel. Since my research is focused on issues of mobility in the early modern 
period, I will concentrate on Vitoria’s discussion of the right to travel, leaving 
aside other equally polemic aspects of his doctrine, that have also unleashed 
fiery debates about Vitoria’s involvement in imperial designs. 
The Limits of Vitoria’s Defense of Freedom of Movement 
Francisco de Vitoria defended the idea of freedom of movement in his 
public lecture ‘On the American Indians’ given at the University of Salamanca in 
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1538-39, where he argued that the Spanish had free passage and were entitled 
to travel and dwell in the New World, as long as they caused no harm, since 
it was considered as part of the law of nations that men enjoyed free mutual 
intercourse anywhere they went. As he himself put it, 
‘The Spaniards have the right to travel and dwell in those 
countries, so long as they do no harm to the barbarians, 
and cannot be prevented by them from doing so (…).  
Amongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat 
strangers and travelers badly without some especial cause, 
humane and dutiful to behave hospitably to strangers. This 
would not be the case if travellers were doing something 
evil by visiting foreign nations. Second, in the beginning 
of the world, when all things were held in common, 
everyone was allowed to visit and travel through every 
land he wished. This right was clearly not taken away 
by the division of property; it was never the intention of 
nations to prevent men’s free mutual intercourse with one 
another by this division’ (278-279). 
This right was part of what Vitoria conceived as natural partnership and 
communication, in which the Spaniards, regarded as neighbors, were entitled 
to enjoy free passage and trade, and could settle and become citizens (280). This 
implied that the Spanish ships were allowed to put in on any shore, and they 
could make use of any common property, such as the sea, the roads and the 
rivers. They had the right to appropriate things which did not belong to anyone, 
like ‘gold in the ground or pearls in the sea or anything else in the rivers’ (280). 
He mainly referred to the right to travel in the context of the Spanish going to 
the New World, but he also briefly mentioned the idea of free passage in the 
European context. In Vitoria’s words, ‘it would not be lawful for the French to 
prohibit Spaniards from travelling or even living in France, or vice versa, so 
long as it caused no sort of harm to themselves’ (278).
Vitoria probably had in mind that the Spanish were not mere travelers, a 
point made by one of his disciples, Melchor Cano (1509-1560), in which he 
sarcastically indicated how Alexander the Great was not precisely travelling. 
In Cano’s words, ‘it is unclear that the Indians have done any injury, unarmed 
and timid as they are, nor is it clear that they have ever acted in an inhuman 
way, especially since the Spaniards [have entered] not as travelers but as 
invaders  –unless one were to label Alexander a traveler. For the Spaniards 
themselves wouldn’t endure this at the hands of the French’ (Cano, 1982: 579). 
Likewise, Domingo de Soto (1495-1560) disapproved of the way in which 
Vitoria seemed to have presented a doctrine that allowed one people to freely 
move around plundering the resources of others. Regarding whether it was 
licit for his compatriots to go from one nation to another searching for gold, 
Soto considered it to be so because the law of nations had not established a 
division over these things. However, he maintained that it was not completely 
licit if the inhabitants did not give their consent to others becoming owners 
of their resources, unless they had abandoned them. As the law of nations had 
established a division between regions, strangers could not make use of these 
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things without the consent of its inhabitants (Soto, 1968: 423). 
Bartolome de las Casas (1484–1566) considered that closing borders was 
in fact required when peace and tranquility were at risk (Las Casas, 1958: 129). 
And the Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535-1600) considered that the wide scope of 
Vitoria´s right to travel allowed entry to large numbers of armed foreigners, 
something that would not have been accepted among European nations. The 
Spanish themselves had actually expelled the Jews and the Moors from their 
land, and something like granting the French a right to free passage in Spanish 
territory could hardly have been conceived. Molina held that any sovereign state 
had the right to close its borders and deny goods to inhabitants of other regions, 
unless they were in extreme need. It was legitimate to deny entry to foreigners, 
especially if some harm, such as being conquered, was feared, meaning that 
newcomers could then be barred from the country’s possessions, which were, 
according to Molina: ‘the joint property of all its citizens’ (Molina, 1947: 337). 
In this way, Molina assimilated the property of the individual to the property 
of the commonwealth, so that, in his own words: ‘the country’s common 
possessions over which the entire community has control are just as much its 
own belongings as the personal possessions of the individual citizens are their 
own belongings’ (337). Thus, just as an individual could keep anyone off his 
property, so could a commonwealth, and the state could legitimately refuse 
commerce, harbor facilities and residence to strangers, without doing them an 
injury which would cause a just war. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) also examined 
some of these questions and considered that the right of settlement was 
applicable, not only to individuals, but to entire political communities that had 
been displaced for some reason. Just as with any individual, communities were 
protected by the rule of hospitality, which he considered a moral requirement 
(Grotius, 2005: 447-448). The difficulties of this posture, according to Annabel 
Brett’s interpretation, was that Grotius´ hospitality allowed any community to 
move around and set up their own imperium (Brett, 2011: 200).
Recent scholars still accuse Vitoria of presenting an apology for imperialism, 
considering his arguments to be a contribution to the attempt to suppress the 
non-Western world (Anghie, 1996: 326). From Antony Anghie’s perspective, 
the universal natural law defended by Vitoria was nothing more than ‘the 
particular cultural practices of the Spanish, unilaterally taken to a universal 
level’ (332). To Anghie, Vitoria’s argument implied that the Indians could be 
legitimately disciplined and subjected if they did not follow the set of European 
ideals. Vitoria’s main tool, he concluded, was the theory of the just war, so if the 
Indians refused the Spaniards entry in their cities, or expelled them once they 
were there, their behavior counted as an act of war that had to be redressed. 
Anghie thus quoted Vitoria: ‘to keep certain people out of the city or province 
as being enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war’ (326). 
Anthony Pagden presented a similar argument, concluding that Vitoria’s 
theory allowed the Spanish to wage a just war if the ius peregrinandi and the 
ius predicandi were not respected (Pagden, 1990: 87). As explained by Anghie, 
since Vitoria considered that depriving a man of his natural rights constituted 
an injury, and the vindication of injuries was a just cause of war, the Indians’ 
refusal of free passage to the Spanish could be considered grounds for a just war 
(326).
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 Nevertheless, a closer reading of Vitoria’s words reveals his underlying 
insistence on the idea that the travelling of the Spanish had to be harmless. He 
supported the idea of free mutual intercourse and hospitable behavior towards 
strangers, in the context of ordered and peaceful relations. His doctrine was not 
a campaign for the domination of one side over the other, but an expression 
of his sincere ‘belief in equitable and isotropic relations between peoples’, as 
Davis Boruchoff has recently put it (Boruchoff, 2015: 37). Vitoria’s passages in 
defense of freedom of movement were almost always followed by the condition 
of not causing any harm, as when he explicitly warned: ‘Amongst all nations 
it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and travelers badly without some 
especial cause, humane and dutiful to behave hospitably to strangers. This 
would not be the case if travellers were doing something evil by visiting foreign 
nations’. In any case, Vitoria concluded, any activity that causes no harm should 
be considered lawful. In his own words: ‘All things which are not prohibited 
or otherwise to the harm and detriment of others are lawful. Since the travels 
of the Spaniards are (as we may for the moment assume) neither harmful not 
detrimental to the barbarians, they are lawful’ (278).
Assuming, as Vitoria did in a rather abstract and theoretical manner, that 
the travels of the Spanish were harmless, there is the question of whether it was 
lawful to resort to war if the right to harmless travel was denied. In this case 
it should be pointed out that Vitoria’s treatment of the issue of war was not 
very systematic. On one hand, he seemed to permit the waging of war, since 
a refusal of free passage without due cause was an offence against the law of 
nations. If the Spaniards were denied what was ‘theirs by the law of nations’, 
said Vitoria, ‘they may lawfully go to war’ (282). On the other hand, Vitoria also 
insisted on referring to war as a self-defense tool that could only be used if the 
Indians effectively attacked the Spanish or persisted in ‘replying with violence’ 
(282). This seemed to suggest that war could only be made as a response to the 
Indians’ acts of aggression, and in order to protect their own safety, or to avenge 
and redress an offence (Vitoria, 1991: 282, Tierney, 2007: 109). In this way, if the 
Spaniards were put under attack, after having demonstrated that they had come 
to dwell in peace and cause no harm, they could lawfully ‘meet force with force’ 
by defending themselves (Vitoria, 1991: 282).
In addition, as Vitoria pointed out, the context of the Indians’ attacks had 
to be examined, since reasonable fears might have moved them to do so. As 
he put it, ‘the barbarians may still be understandably fearful of men whose 
customs seem so strange, and whom they can see are armed and much stronger 
than themselves’ (282). According to Vitoria, the Indians’ fears made them 
innocent and their ignorance made war just on their side as well (Schroder, 
2010: 163-173). This, according to Annabel Brett, implied that Vitoria could not 
have considered the Indians’ eventual violation of the right to travel as an act of 
aggression, for their opposition to the Spanish entry could have been based on 
their vulnerable position and lack of equal force (Brett, 2011: 15). 
Freedom of Movement as a Law of Nations
The freedom of mobility defended by Vitoria and other members of the 
Salamanca School was grounded in the idea of a universal human community 
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and was legally backed by the law of nations. In effect, Vitoria maintained that 
the right to travel was valued among all nations, all of them considering the 
mistreatment of strangers to be inhuman. Nevertheless, from Vitoria’s account 
it is unclear whether this duty of the law of nations towards strangers was part 
of the natural law, or rather a human positive consensus (Vitoria, 1934: cxi). 
I consider that Vitoria’s lectures on Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, delivered 
in the academic session of 1533-4, are determining in this regard, since they 
presented a broader and slightly more extensive view on the law of nations In 
his commentaries to question 57, article 3, on whether the law of nations could 
be distinguished from natural law, Vitoria offered an explanation that placed 
the law of nations closer to a promulgated positive human law, derived from 
the ‘common consensus of all peoples and nations’ (Vitoria, 1934: cxi-cxii). 
As he stated, things that were of natural law were ‘equal and absolutely just’, 
like the natural law precept that stated: ‘because no wrong is done to you, you 
do no wrong to another’ (Vitoria, 1934: cxi), or ‘avoid giving offence to those 
among whom one has to live’ (Aquinas, 2002: 118). In contrast, the dealings of 
the law of nations were to be considered as a ‘certain disposition of things with 
relation to a third just thing’ (Vitoria, 1934: cxi), in other words, the precepts of 
the law of nations were to be conceived as a means for something else, which 
according to Vitoria, was peace and concord amongst men. These precepts, 
which included issues like the immunity of ambassadors, the treatment of 
captives of war, and the regulation of private property, did not have equity of 
their own, but only as they were employed to fulfill peaceful aims (Vitoria, 
1934: cxi). In Vitoria’s words: ‘that which is not in itself just, but is derived from 
human statute firmly established in reason, is called law of nations, so that on 
its own account it does not imply equity, but on account of something else’ 
(Vitoria, 1934: cxi). The law of nations’ regulations about war or diplomacy 
were to be considered as good in a relative manner, since they were to be judged 
depending on whether they aimed to bring peace and preserve natural law. I 
would like to suggest that these general features of the law of nations can fill 
some of the gaps that Vitoria left in his defense of the Spanish right to travel. 
As with the immunity of ambassadors, the right to travel was part of the law 
of nations and as such, had to serve the purpose of bringing peace and unity 
among men. If the travelers were a large group of armed foreigners, they could 
not claim a right to travel, since the harm it entailed would violate the natural 
law. 
Concluding Remarks
As part of the law of nations, the Spanish right to travel could not be taken 
in absolute terms, for it had to serve the purpose of bringing peace and unity 
among men, and could not contradict natural law. In this way, the right to 
travel was not in itself just or unjust. Instead, it was its aims which could be 
judged either way. In addition, Vitoria explicitly observed that the right to 
travel was only valid if the Spaniards caused no harm, a condition that has 
been underestimated by his critics. Vitoria’s defense of peaceful travel was 
not precisely influential on the policy makers of his time, and the disastrous 
historical outcomes of the Spanish affairs in the Indies led to misleading 
readings of his doctrine. Concerned as he was with the formulation of a set of 
theoretical just titles by which the realities of his time could eventually have 
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been legitimized, he presented his arguments in terms of principles and not 
facts. Again, only actual facts would prove that the Spaniards´ right to travel 
had gone beyond the limits established in Vitoria´s formulation. However, 
his legacy is of enormous value, as a long lasting discussion was then initiated 
regarding the question of the grounds under which human mobility could 
be restricted. Under Vitoria’s argument it was clear that this freedom was 
not absolute, but the controversial character of this case demonstrates how 
difficult it was and still is to address the issue of the movement of peoples across 
frontiers.
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